|
Hello and thank you for joining us as we
carry on with our examination of the sweeping social and political
reforms instituted during the first two years of the Second
Republic. This week we will study the attempts made by the
Azaña administration at curtailing the excessive power
of Army and Church within the Spanish state. Over the centuries,
both of these organizations had come to wield a disproportionate
share of influence in the running of internal affairs and
in the very texture and fabric of daily existence. The Reformist
government was quick to implement a series of measures designed
to bring these institutions in line with their constitutionally
delimited purpose in society (i.e. national defence in the
case of the Army and spiritual ministration in the case of
the Church), thus securing the running of state to the offices
of a civilian and secular government.
Azaña’s Leadership in Government
Before starting on the actual reforms, I
would like to insert a short biographical note on Manuel Azaña
y Diaz whom we have previously mentioned as one of the leading
intellectual and political figures of the Second Republic.
This week’s topic in particular highlights his personal
contribution to government policy; for, not only did Azaña
possess first-hand knowledge of both military and ecclesiastic
matters, his lofty standing within the Republic put him in
a position to effectively act on this knowledge. As regards
his cognizance of military matters, his years as a World!
War I press correspondent had prepared him well for his subsequent
appointment as Minister of War, a portfolio he combined with
the presidency of the executive cabinet throughout the Reformist
Biennium. As regards his acquaintance with ecclesiastic matters,
it was not the study of theology per se, but rather his experiences
as a young boarding student at the monastery of El Escorial,
near Madrid, which made him, reject the values and methodology
of parochial education. Let us first turn our attention to
his restructuring of the armed forces.
The Army within Spanish Society
To fully understand the situation of the
Spanish Army at the time of the Republic, we must backtrack
to the black year of 1898 and Spain’s defeat in the Spanish
American War. At this critical juncture, two factors that
would have long-term consequences for Spanish society came
into play. Firstly, Spain lost two of its few remaining colonies,
Cuba and the Philippines, to the United States. As mentioned
in earlier instalments, the resulting decline in international
status cut a deep wound into the Spanish psyche. Naturally,
the injury was felt most acutely in military circles, whose
leaders (perhaps correctly) blamed the inefficiency of the
civilian government for their defeat.
The second factor that began to shape Spanish
society at this time came as the inevitable sequitur to the
loss of colonial territory, that is, large contingents of
overseas military staff, suddenly deprived of their colonial
assignations, were channelled back into Spanish territory.
Most concretely, the return of numerous lieutenants and viceroys
resulted in a surplus of high-ranking army officials with
no suitable positions available to them. For better or for
worse, this condition was mitigated somewhat during Primo
de Rivera’s dictatorship when members of the military
were assigned to previously civilian posts. The long colonial
conflict with Morocco (1909-1927) also helped to take up much
of the slack in personnel.
Indeed, ever since the mid 19th century,
the Spanish Army had been playing the role of arbitrator in
the country’s frequent political changeovers, often ushering
in governments that were presided by generals rather than
statesmen. The Army also assumed the function of urban law
enforcement during the years of social unrest that plagued
Spain more or less continuously in the early 1900s. It was
in the year 1905, however, when the military’s sphere
of influence blatantly spilled over into the public domain.
After a press scandal in which the Army was used as the brunt
of a political satire, the military hierarchy was granted
the power to impose its own jurisdiction in non-military affairs.
Under the new law, the infamous Ley de Jurisdicciones, military
courts were authorized to try cases in which the honour of
the Army was seen to be in any way jeopardized.
Army Downsized
In order to restore a healthy balance of
power between civilian and military matters, Azaña
instituted a series of measures that both streamlined and
modernized the internal organization of the Army. His first
move was to reduce the number of military divisions from sixteen
to eight, with each division falling under the authority of
one general. In order to eliminate the excess of redundant
officers, Azaña devised a voluntary withdrawal plan
whereby those generals and officials who opted for early retirement
would continue to receive the same monthly stipend as they
had while in active service.
Azaña’s next move was to ensure
that an inflated sense of military empowerment did not encroach
upon civil authority. To this end he abolished the aforementioned
‘Law of Jurisdictions’ and its corresponding ‘Supreme
Court of the Army and the Armada’, stipulating that any
case involving the conflict of civilian and military interests
would henceforth be tried in common law courts. Another measure
designed to eliminate the potential overlapping of civil and
military powers was to abolish the rank of Captain General.
This position represented the maximum echelon within the armed
forces, equivalent to the rank of viceroy in the old colonial
order, and therefore carrying with it the prerogative to assume
the control of state in given circumstances.
Finally, Azaña’s intention of
revising Primo de Rivera’s policy of military promotions
was met with considerable hostility. The former dictator had
established the basis of ascension strictly on battle merits
rather than on seniority. It was during this time, incidentally,
that Francisco Franco, a combatant in the Moroccan conflict,
was promoted to the rank of general. His fighting prowess
notwithstanding, the soon-to-be superlative general was not
particularly outstanding as far as the application of intellect
was concerned, having graduated from his military academy
in the bottom sixth of his class. It was little wonder, then,
that he and his cronies could not appreciate the social value
of the reforms enacted by one as intellectually gifted as
Azaña. As one straight-talking political analyst put
it:
“In reality, [the military] did not
want to recognize the supremacy of civil power. In many cases
(Sanjuro, Goded, Franco, Mola, Queipo de Llano, among others)
their hatred of Azaña derived in part from personal
resentment over certain decisions they considered contrary
to their particular interests, above all destitutions and
changes in post. All of this fit in with the Army’s aversion
to the republican social reforms and the decentralization
of state, which, in their opinion, endangered the unity of
the patria.”
Closing
It is clear that a lethal cocktail of personal
animosities had begun to brew within the military elite. Each
attempt on Azaña’s part to demilitarize society
only served to strengthen the sentiment of hatred against
him, a force which eventually destroyed his government and
forced him into exile. Give us a read next week as we go on
to explore another massive block of anti-republican resistance:
The Church.
Emily Kaufman
emilykaufman@ibizahistoryculture.com
| |
