Hello and thank you for joining us as we carry on with our examination
of the sweeping social and political reforms instituted during the first
two years of the Second Republic. This week we will study the attempts
made by the Azaña administration at curtailing the excessive power of
Army and Church within the Spanish state. Over the centuries, both of
these organizations had come to wield a disproportionate share of
influence in the running of internal affairs and in the very texture and
fabric of daily existence. The Reformist government was quick to
implement a series of measures designed to bring these institutions in
line with their constitutionally delimited purpose in society (i.e.
national defence in the case of the Army and spiritual ministration in
the case of the Church), thus securing the running of state to the
offices of a civilian and secular government.
Azaña’s Leadership in Government
Before starting on the actual reforms, I would like to insert a short
biographical note on Manuel Azaña y Diaz whom we have previously
mentioned as one of the leading intellectual and political figures of
the Second Republic. This week’s topic in particular highlights his
personal contribution to government policy; for, not only did Azaña
possess first-hand knowledge of both military and ecclesiastic matters,
his lofty standing within the Republic put him in a position to
effectively act on this knowledge. As regards his cognizance of military
matters, his years as a World! War I press correspondent had prepared
him well for his subsequent appointment as Minister of War, a portfolio
he combined with the presidency of the executive cabinet throughout the
Reformist Biennium. As regards his acquaintance with ecclesiastic
matters, it was not the study of theology per se, but rather his
experiences as a young boarding student at the monastery of El
Escorial, near Madrid, which made him, reject the values and
methodology of parochial education. Let us first turn our attention to
his restructuring of the armed forces.
The Army within Spanish Society
To
fully understand the situation of the Spanish Army at the time of the
Republic, we must backtrack to the black year of 1898 and Spain’s defeat
in the Spanish American War. At this critical juncture, two factors that
would have long-term consequences for Spanish society came into play.
Firstly, Spain lost two of its few remaining colonies, Cuba and the
Philippines, to the United States. As mentioned in earlier instalments,
the resulting decline in international status cut a deep wound into the
Spanish psyche. Naturally, the injury was felt most acutely in military
circles, whose leaders (perhaps correctly) blamed the inefficiency of
the civilian government for their defeat.
The
second factor that began to shape Spanish society at this time came as
the inevitable sequitur to the loss of colonial territory, that is,
large contingents of overseas military staff, suddenly deprived of their
colonial assignations, were channelled back into Spanish territory. Most
concretely, the return of numerous lieutenants and viceroys resulted in
a surplus of high-ranking army officials with no suitable positions
available to them. For better or for worse, this condition was mitigated
somewhat during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship when members of the
military were assigned to previously civilian posts. The long colonial
conflict with Morocco (1909-1927) also helped to take up much of the
slack in personnel.
Indeed, ever since the mid 19th century, the Spanish Army had been
playing the role of arbitrator in the country’s frequent political
changeovers, often ushering in governments that were presided by
generals rather than statesmen. The Army also assumed the function of
urban law enforcement during the years of social unrest that plagued
Spain more or less continuously in the early 1900s. It was in the year
1905, however, when the military’s sphere of influence blatantly spilled
over into the public domain. After a press scandal in which the Army was
used as the brunt of a political satire, the military hierarchy was
granted the power to impose its own jurisdiction in non-military
affairs. Under the new law, the infamous Ley de Jurisdicciones,
military courts were authorized to try cases in which the honour of the
Army was seen to be in any way jeopardized.
Army Downsized
In
order to restore a healthy balance of power between civilian and
military matters, Azaña instituted a series of measures that both
streamlined and modernized the internal organization of the Army. His
first move was to reduce the number of military divisions from sixteen
to eight, with each division falling under the authority of one general.
In order to eliminate the excess of redundant officers, Azaña devised a
voluntary withdrawal plan whereby those generals and officials who opted
for early retirement would continue to receive the same monthly stipend
as they had while in active service.
Azaña’s next move was to ensure that an inflated sense of military
empowerment did not encroach upon civil authority. To this end he
abolished the aforementioned ‘Law of Jurisdictions’ and its
corresponding ‘Supreme Court of the Army and the Armada’, stipulating
that any case involving the conflict of civilian and military interests
would henceforth be tried in common law courts. Another measure designed
to eliminate the potential overlapping of civil and military powers was
to abolish the rank of Captain General. This position represented the
maximum echelon within the armed forces, equivalent to the rank of
viceroy in the old colonial order, and therefore carrying with it the
prerogative to assume the control of state in given circumstances.
Finally, Azaña’s intention of revising Primo de Rivera’s policy of
military promotions was met with considerable hostility. The former
dictator had established the basis of ascension strictly on battle
merits rather than on seniority. It was during this time, incidentally,
that Francisco Franco, a combatant in the Moroccan conflict, was
promoted to the rank of general. His fighting prowess notwithstanding,
the soon-to-be superlative general was not particularly outstanding as
far as the application of intellect was concerned, having graduated from
his military academy in the bottom sixth of his class. It was
little wonder, then, that he and his cronies could not appreciate the
social value of the reforms enacted by one as intellectually gifted as
Azaña. As one straight-talking political analyst put it:
“In
reality, [the military] did not want to recognize the supremacy of civil
power. In many cases (Sanjuro, Goded, Franco, Mola, Queipo de Llano,
among others) their hatred of Azaña derived in part from personal
resentment over certain decisions they considered contrary to their
particular interests, above all destitutions and changes in post. All of
this fit in with the Army’s aversion to the republican social reforms
and the decentralization of state, which, in their opinion, endangered
the unity of the patria.”
Closing
It
is clear that a lethal cocktail of personal animosities had begun to
brew within the military elite. Each attempt on Azaña’s part to
demilitarize society only served to strengthen the sentiment of hatred
against him, a force which eventually destroyed his government and
forced him into exile. Give us a read next week as we go on to
explore another massive block of anti-republican resistance: The Church.
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